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ABSTRACT
Using a laboratory experiment we explore competing claims on
the welfare effects of civil forfeiture. Experiment participants are
tasked with making trade-offs in allocating resources “to fight crime”
with and without the ability to seize and forfeit assets. It is an
open question whether the societal impact of reducing crime is
greater in a world with or without civil forfeiture. Proponents
of civil forfeiture argue that the ill-gotten gains of criminals can
be used by law enforcement to further fight crime. Opponents
claim that the confiscation of assets by law enforcement distorts
the prioritization of cases by focusing attention, not on cases with
the largest societal impact, but on those with the highest valued
assets that can be seized. We find that the public is better off in a
world without civil forfeiture.
Keywords: Civil asset forfeiture, Experimental economics, Law and Economics
JEL Codes: C90, K39
1

Introduction

Civil asset forfeiture is a legal procedure that allows law enforcement to seize
property allegedly used in the commission of a crime—without ever charging
the property owner with a crime. Needless to say, the use of civil forfeiture
has led to controversy. Indeed, the most contentious aspect of civil forfeiture
is that most forfeiture statutes authorize law enforcement, including police
departments and district attorneys’ offices, to keep a percentage, if not all, of
∗ We thank the editor and two reviewers for suggestions that have improved the paper.
We also thank Megan Luetje for recruiting our experiment participants and Jeffrey Kirchner
for his professional software programming. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge research
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the proceeds obtained from a successful forfeiture. On one hand, proponents
of civil forfeiture contend that its use gives law enforcement the incentive to
target large-scale criminal organizations, that it has allowed law enforcement
to dismantle criminal organizations, and that any instances of abuse have
occurred only on a small scale. On the other hand, opponents of civil forfeiture
contend that its use displaces legitimate law enforcement objectives: that
law enforcement tends to focus on maximizing forfeiture revenue rather than
reducing crime with the largest societal impact. That being so, opponents of
civil forfeiture contend that the incentives created by it have led to systematic
abuse.
As of this date, it is unclear which side is correct. Perhaps both are correct.
Perhaps none. Proponents of civil forfeiture muster logical arguments to
support their position, while opponents of civil forfeiture do the same. But
these arguments can only do so much. What is needed is empirical evidence
regarding the claims and counterclaims. Our empirical model evaluates whether
the use of civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to bolster its fight against
crime or whether it incentivizes law enforcement to maximize forfeiture revenue
instead of providing public benefits that yield no revenue for law enforcement.
This article addresses that gap.
Here we explore competing claims of efficiency for civil forfeiture using
a laboratory experiment. Experiment participants are tasked with making
trade-offs in allocating resources “to fight crime” with and without the ability
to seize and forfeit assets. Our goal is to assess whether the societal impact of
reducing crime is greater in a world with or without the financial incentives of
civil forfeiture.
Based on the empirical findings below, we conclude that welfare is greater
in a world without civil forfeiture than in a world with it.

2

A Brief Overview of Civil Forfeiture

Civil asset forfeiture is a legal doctrine that allows law enforcement to seize
property used in the commission of a crime.1 It is founded on the legal fiction
that the forfeiture proceedings are brought not against the alleged criminal or
property owner, but are rather brought against the property itself.2 That is
why forfeiture proceedings have such interesting names like United States v.
support from the Institute for Justice. This paper reflects the opinions of the authors and
does not necessarily reflect the position of Buchalter, Chapman University, or the Institute
for Justice.
1 For the purposes of brevity “civil asset forfeiture” will simply be referred to as civil
forfeiture.
2 Barnet (2001) discusses the general use of legal fictions in American jurisprudence, how
legal fiction was used in forfeiture to justify the destruction of a “guilty” piece of property
and then to its justification as a revenue-generating device for the English Crown.
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434 Main Street, Twerksbury, Massachusetts 3 or United States v. $671,160.00
in U.S. Currency.4 By doing so, law enforcement can seize property without
convicting—or even prosecuting—the property owner of a crime. And because
civil forfeiture does not require a criminal conviction, the guilt or innocence of
the property owner is irrelevant. All that is required is for the prosecutor to
establish a statutory basis for forfeiture. Law enforcement only need to prove
the property’s connection to criminal activity by preponderance of evidence
standard or in some states under the lower probable cause standard—not the
strict standard beyond a reasonable doubt required for criminal convictions.5
Once done, the burden often shifts to the property owner to prove his or her
property’s innocence.6
Civil forfeiture is not to be confused with criminal forfeiture. Criminal
forfeiture proceedings are brought in personam (against a person) and can
only be enforced if preceded by a criminal conviction (Skorup, 2012). There,
forfeiture is imposed upon a convict as part of his punishment, and the
forfeiture order is imposed against the criminal himself, not his property
(Cassella, 2008). More importantly, in a criminal proceeding, prosecutors
must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.7 Civil forfeiture
proceedings, on the other hand, are brought in rem (against a thing), and
forfeiture is imposed against the property owner’s property—not the property
owner. And contrary to criminal forfeiture, prosecutors only need to prove that
the property was associated with a crime through a low standard of proof. The
burden is on the property owner to prove that the property was not involved in
the crime. Further, criminal defendants are entitled to specific Constitutional
rights. Not so in civil forfeiture (Chi, 2002). The Constitution only protects
people, not inanimate objects.
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act (“Control Act”), which allowed drug-related civil forfeiture by the
federal government.8 Under this legislation, however, all forfeiture revenue
was deposited into U.S. Treasury’s general fund. But in 1984, Congress
amended the Control Act to allow federal enforcement agencies to keep the
forfeited proceedings, and share forfeiture proceeds with state and local law
enforcement through a program known as “equitable sharing” (Blumenson
3 961

F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Mass. 2013).
F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2013).
5 In Georgia, for example, the standard of proof law enforcement must meet to acquire
property through civil forfeiture is based on a “probable cause” standard [see Ga. Code Ann.
§16-13-49 (2014)].
6 For a fuller explanation detailing the mechanics of civil forfeiture, see Pimentel (2012).
For a great resource guide to civil forfeiture, see Edgeworth (2008). And for those just
interested in learning more about civil forfeiture, see Gurulé et al. (2004).
7 See e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (criminal convictions require
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt determined by a jury).
8 21 U.S.C. §881(f)(1), enacted originally in 1970 as Pub. L. No. 91-513, sec. 511, 84
Stat. 1236.
4 730
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and Nilsen, 1998). Many states passed similar legislation.9 Since then, civil
forfeiture has constituted a lucrative mechanism for federal, state, and local
governments to finance the War on Drugs.
3

Reasons For Civil Forfeiture
When judiciously applied, forfeiture statutes permit law enforcement officers to seize assets that criminal organizations, large or
small, need to continue and flourish in their operations. Criminal organizations, like legitimate business, must have operating
capital and equipment to thrive. Without those assets, criminal
organizations, like legitimate businesses, cannot afford to operate.
—Williams, 2002a.

Proponents of civil forfeiture recognize it as a tremendous power with
the potential to be misused. But if prudently applied, proponents argue
that it gives law enforcement the necessary power to combat crime. It does
this in three broad strokes. Civil forfeiture hurts criminals where it counts:
their wallets. The forfeiture proceeds are then used by law enforcement to
supplement their own budgets, easing the tax burden on American taxpayers.
Lastly, civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to punish criminals when they
might otherwise be untouchable.
Contrary to opponents, proponents of civil forfeiture argue that statutes,
which permit law enforcement to keep forfeiture proceeds, give law enforcement
a proper incentive to decrease crime. This benefits society. With the knowledge
that their police department is entitled to forfeited proceeds, or that their
salary depends on it, police officers are more likely to focus their attention
on crimes with the highest forfeiture yield rates. This translates into law
enforcement focusing their attention on large-scale narcotic trafficking. Then
once the illicit property is confiscated, the forfeiture proceeds are reinvested
back into law enforcement to further crime reduction. And so on.
Indeed, the primary justification for civil forfeiture is that it deprives
criminal organizations their working capital to engage in illicit activities
(Williams, 2002a). Criminal organizations are hierarchical. Drug lords in the
top echelons of these hierarchies are careful to shield themselves from any
direct involvement with criminal activity, while low-level drug peddlers take
all the risk in handling the contraband. As a result, law enforcement is often
only able to arrest low-level drug peddlers, while the criminal masterminds
roam free. The problem with criminal organizations, such as drug cartels, is
9 See, e.g., Ala. Code §20-2-93 (2014); Fla. Stat. §932.704 (2014); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§60-4105 (2014); W. Va. Code §60A-7-705 (2014).
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that there is a surplus of able individuals ready to participate in the criminal
enterprise. For every person law enforcement arrests, there are two more ready
to take his or her place. That being so, focusing law enforcement’s resources on
arresting low-level criminals does nothing to thwart the criminal organization’s
overall operation.
Given that, proponents of civil forfeiture argue that the government’s
ability to seize criminal proceeds is a powerful economic weapon. Forfeiture
statutes allow law enforcement to seize capital that criminal organizations
need to operate. Similar to legitimate businesses, criminal organizations need
capital investments, corporate infrastructure, and on-hand cash. Remove those
assets, and the criminal organization will cease to exist. And in the long run,
proponents infer that there should be a significant drop in the number of
criminal organizations due to law enforcement’s use of civil forfeiture.
Not only does civil forfeiture allow law enforcement to dismantle existing
criminal organizations, proponents argue it deters future criminal organizations
from arising. Although potential criminals may not be deterred by possible
imprisonment, they may be sufficiently deterred from criminal activity if they
are unable to recoup the proceeds of their capital investments. If criminal
investors recognize the immense risk of civil forfeiture, they will avoid investment in criminal activity altogether. Civil forfeiture is therefore synonymous
with the old police motto, “crime does not pay.”
Proponents also claim civil forfeiture benefits American taxpayers. Let’s
face it. Law enforcement isn’t cheap. And each year federal, state, and local
governments spend billions of dollars to fund their respective enforcement
agencies. This amounts to a heavy burden for American taxpayers. But
civil forfeiture significantly eases this burden, because enforcement agencies
across the Nation use forfeited assets to supplement their operating budgets,
to build jails, or to fund education and rehabilitation programs. In 2012 alone,
forfeiture proceeds at the U.S. Department of Justice reached an impressive
$4.2 billion [Stillman (2013) and U.S. Department of Justice (2014)].
Proponents also contend that civil forfeiture prevents corruption. As
Williams (2002a) put it best, “[i]llicit money is power, and illicit power is
corrupting.” Criminal organizations can amass a tremendous amount of wealth.
And this wealth attracts law enforcement, politicians, lawyers, bankers, and
accountants who are willing work for the criminal organization and help launder
illicit funds through legitimate sources. Indeed, this has become a significant
problem in Mexico. According to Hildago (2014), the notorious Joaquín “El
Chapo” Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, spent approximately $1.2 billion
dollars per year bribing law enforcement throughout Mexico. To put this
staggering amount in context, the United States’ aid package to Mexico to
fight organized crime totaled $1.6 billion. Illicit money also has the power
to corrupt the judicial system by influencing witness testimony and judges.
According to Buch (2013), for example, federal agents arrested two people
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trying to bribe a federal judge with $1 million dollars to reduce the prison
sentence of a business owner who helped launder millions of dollars for the
Zetas cartel.
Williams (2002a) also appears to make the argument that the use civil
forfeiture stabilizes the economy. Given that criminal organizations can generate immense wealth from their illicit activities, they often launder their gains
through legitimate businesses. By doing so, however, this floods capital into
the marketplace and distorts the market. And legitimate businesses are unable
to compete with tainted businesses backed by criminal subsidies.
Further, unlike lengthy criminal proceedings, forfeiture statutes offer law
enforcement a quicker response to apprehend scammers and return the money
back to victims. For example, when the government discovered a fraud scheme
in 1996, it used forfeiture law to seize $225 million dollars before the individual
could transfer the funds overseas. If law enforcement were required to seek
a criminal conviction against that individual before seizing those assets, the
funds would have disappeared before his conviction. This only hurts victims.
Since 2012, the Department of Justice has returned over $1.5 billion dollars in
forfeited assets to four hundred thousand crime victims (Stillman, 2013).
Further, proponents contend that prosecuting an alleged criminal’s property
through civil forfeiture is justified because it is significantly less expensive
than prosecuting the alleged criminal (Skorup, 2012). Through civil forfeiture,
prosecutors bring suit against the alleged criminal’s property—not the criminal
himself. This distinction is important. Unlike the alleged criminal, the property
is not entitled to Constitutional protections. As such, the government can
seize the property by showing that the property was involved with crime
through a low standard of proof. This is defensible because 80% of forfeiture
proceedings are uncontested (Cassella, 2008). If the forfeitures are uncontested
in any event, the government saves resources by treating the forfeiture as an
administrative matter against the property.
Proponents like Cassella (2008) argue that civil forfeiture is also justified
when the wrongdoer is unidentifiable. Take drug couriers for example. Drug
couriers are individuals who transport narcotics or cash on behalf of a criminal
organization. Drug couriers have no ownership rights in the “packages” they
transport, but get compensation by acquiring a fee for their transportation
services. In this situation, law enforcement cannot bring criminal charges
against the narcotic owners because they are unknown. Thus, civil forfeiture
provides the only available option to confiscate the contraband.
Further, the use of civil forfeiture is sometimes preferable to other criminal
punishments, and allows law enforcement to be lenient in particular circumstances. There are many situations, for example, where the interests of justice
would not require a criminal conviction, and civil forfeiture would be sufficient
to punish the wrongdoer. Think of the teenager who uses his home computer
to counterfeit currency. Here, the appropriate law enforcement response would
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be to confiscate the computer, rather than incarcerate the teenager. Or think
of the terminally ill woman smoking marijuana to ease her pain in a state
that does not recognize medical marijuana. Clearly, incarcerating the woman
would be severe where simply seizing her narcotics would be appropriate.
In brief, proponents believe civil forfeiture is law enforcement’s greatest
weapon in its fight against crime. Where sometimes criminal law can come up
short, civil forfeiture goes the distance.10

4

Reasons against Civil Forfeiture
When asked why a search warrant would not be served on a suspect
known to have resale quantities of marijuana in his apartment, one
officer replied: “Because that would just give us a bunch of dope
and the hassle of having to book him (the suspect). We’ve got all
the dope we need in the property room. Just stick to rounding up
cases with big money and stay away from warrants”.
—Miller and Selva, 1994.

Opponents of civil forfeiture argue that its most pervasive defect occurs
when legislation gives law enforcement a direct financial stake in forfeited
proceeds. When such legislation is implemented, law enforcement has a direct
incentive to maximize forfeiture proceeds. And as a result, law enforcement
agencies tend to focus their activity on obtaining more forfeited proceeds
rather than on reducing crime.
Although civil forfeiture statutes vary across the United States, many
give law enforcement a financial stake in forfeiture proceeds. Currently, 26
states allocate 100% of forfeiture proceeds to their respective law enforcement—
while only 8 states allocate 0% to law enforcement (Murphy, 2011). The
percentage of allocation varies across jurisdictions. For example, Wisconsin’s
forfeiture statutes distribute 50% of forfeiture proceeds to law enforcement,
California’s law enforcement is entitled to 65% of forfeiture proceeds, while
Texas’s forfeiture statutes allocate 90% to law enforcement (Williams et al.,
2010). Forfeiture allocation also varies throughout counties. In one Texas
county, officers can obtain bonuses of up to $26,000 a year from forfeiture
proceeds (Stillman, 2013), and in another Texas county, forfeiture proceeds
pay the assistant district attorney’s entire salary.11 Moreover, although state
10 For

a quick summation of all the main reasons given for implementing civil forfeiture,
Cassella (2013).
11 Controversy has arisen over how local governments allocate and document forfeiture
proceeds. In some jurisdictions no records are kept. In others, the records are vague as to
what the forfeiture proceeds were actually spent on. In Philadelphia, for example, Thompson
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forfeiture laws vary, state law enforcement can circumvent their own laws by
cooperating with the federal government. Through a federal program known as
equitable sharing, if local law enforcement seizes property with any connection
to a federal crime, federal law enforcement can seize the subject property and
then return up to 80% of the proceeds back to the local agency—circumventing
any state forfeiture statute.12 Opponents of civil forfeiture contend that such
an incentive has led to questionable law enforcement conduct and abuse.
A major source of income for law enforcement is through the civil forfeiture
of real property. This is common practice in Philadelphia. According to one
statistic, 2,000 cases were filed against Philadelphia houses from 2008 to 2012
(Thompson, 2013). During that time, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s
Office had a 98% success rate. In a typical year the District Attorney’s Office
raises more than $1 million dollars in annual real estate sales alone. Not
surprisingly, these tactics have led to controversy. In one case, a woman lost
her house because her son sold twenty dollars’ worth of marijuana off her porch.
But the story of Donald Scott is the most troubling. In 1992, Donald
Scott was shot and killed at his Malibu ranch by a twenty-seven-person police
task force (Chi, 2002). Executing a warrant, the police planned to arrest
Scott for allegedly running a 4,000-plant marijuana plantation. No drugs were
found. In fact, a subsequent investigation discovered the search warrant was
based on false evidence. The reason for the raid? The National Park Service
made several attempts to purchase Scott’s two-hundred-acre Malibu ranch,
but Scott rebuffed their offer each time. Seeing an opportunity to finance their
operations, the police intended to seize the ranch through civil forfeiture and
sell it to the National Park Service.
Law enforcement is also allowed to forfeit property used in the commission
of a crime, even if the property belongs to an innocent third party. In Bennis
v. Michigan, Mr. Bennis was caught having sex with a prostitute in his car,
which was jointly owned with his wife, Mrs. Bennis.13 The State of Michigan
forfeited the car since it was used in the commission of a crime. Mrs. Bennis
challenged the forfeiture, arguing it deprived her due process because she was
not allowed to defend the forfeiture proceedings. But the Supreme Court
upheld the forfeiture since Mr. Bennis used the car in the commission of a
crime; Mrs. Bennis’s innocence was irrelevant.
Suffice it to say, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bennis has led to various
examples of overzealous law enforcement and abuse. Indeed, even though
(2013) reports that “[t]he records show that the bulk of Philadelphia’s forfeiture money goes
to ‘salaries’ (the report does not say whose), and ‘municipal task force support.’ The reports
include a line-item for money spent on ‘Community Based Drug & crime Fighting Programs’
and ‘Witness Relocation and/or Protection Expenses.’ In recent years, both of those lines
read ‘$0.00.” ’
12 See 21 U.S.C. §881(e)(1)(A) and 19 U.S.C. §1616a(c).
13 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
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forfeiting property (like a car or cash) from an innocent owner can be troubling,
the situation is exacerbated when law enforcement forfeits an innocent owner’s
house.
Rochelle Bing’s story is typical (Thompson, 2013). Bing is a forty-two
year old health assistant in the city of Philadelphia. She owned a row home
in North Philadelphia. She purchased the home as an investment for her and
her family’s future. By all accounts, she is a productive member of society.
However, in 2009, police raided her house and charged her son, age 24, with
selling eight packets of cocaine to an undercover officer. Bing was not present
at the raid and had nothing to do with her son’s crime. Bing’s son sold illegal
drugs in her house without her knowledge or consent. Although Bing was
innocent, her son had sold drugs from inside Bing’s house, and for that reason
alone the police had authority to seize and forfeit her house.
Opponents stress that the use of civil forfeiture results in a distortion of law
enforcement objectives. Civil forfeiture has been criticized because it motivates
law enforcement to focus on assets and their seizures (for financial reward)
instead of targeting crime. This has been apparent in police roadblocks, stops,
raids, and reverse sting operations. In New York, for example, the New York
City Police Department imposes roadblocks on the southbound lanes of I-95
toward New York City. That is because the southbound lanes contain drug
buyers with large amounts of cash, while the northbound lanes only contain
drivers who already purchased their drugs. As a result, the police are able to
seize the southbound drivers’ cash, which is forfeited to the police, whereas
the drivers on the northbound lanes are free to import drugs into the city (Chi,
2002). Law enforcement in Tennessee has taken a similar approach (Balko,
2013). In Nashville, police officers have a choice. They can stop cars on the
eastbound lanes, which would contain illegal drugs coming from Mexico, or they
can stop cars on the westbound lanes, which contain the illegal drug money
going back to Mexico. According to a television news investigation, police
officers were ten times more likely to focus their attention on the westbound
lanes than the east. “For police coffers, it was better to let the drugs come
into Nashville, be sold and then seize the cash as the dealers left town” (Balko,
2013).
Similar to roadblocks, there is also evidence that law enforcement has
delayed making raids on suspected drug houses until most of the drug supply
had been sold. In one example, police had knowledge that $7,000 to $13,000
dollars’ worth of cocaine was being stored in a drug house. Yet, instead of
implementing search and arrest warrants immediately, the police calculated
the rate at which the cocaine was being sold. “Less drugs meant more cash,
and the agent’s objective was to seize currency rather than cocaine” (Miller
and Selva, 1994). Only after enough cocaine was sold out of the house did the
police conduct the raid, seize the drug assets, and more importantly, seize the
illegal drug money.
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Due to the financial incentives of civil forfeitures, opponents also contend
that police sting operations have been turned upside down. In a traditional
sting operation, the police pose as buyers. When the drug dealer agrees to
sell the contraband to an undercover agent, the dealer is promptly arrested
and the drugs are kept out of the community. But in a controversial and
high-risk tactic known as a “reverse sting” the police now pose as sellers of
large quantities of marijuana or cocaine (Miller and Selva, 1994). The goal
is not to keep drugs off the street—but to confiscate as much drug money as
possible, which is forfeited to the police department. In one example from
Arizona, Flatten (2011) reports that the police agreed to sell five hundred
pounds worth of marijuana for $250,000 dollars. Unfortunately the deal went
bad, and the undercover police agents were shot and killed. In the end, the
police only recovered $999 dollars in one-dollar bills. The rest was counterfeit.
This practice has become such a big business for law enforcement that some
police informants can earn a lucrative living. According to public records, one
confidential informant was paid $248,598 dollars in an 18-month period.
Although proponents of civil forfeiture contend that its use helps defund
criminal organizations, opponents argue there is little empirical evidence to
suggest it has made any statistical difference in reducing overall criminal
conduct (Williams, 2002b).14 Instead of deterring unlawful activity, criminal
organizations have simply included possible civil forfeitures as the cost of doing
business. Moreover, there is some indication, at least at the local level, that law
enforcement has little interest in extinguishing the crime in which they acquire
forfeiture proceeds from. According to the New Yorker, law enforcement in
Tenaha, Texas continually harassed so-called “smurfs,” individuals that carry
money for criminal organizations and deposit it at banks in small amounts
to avoid detection. Law enforcement confiscate the smurf’s illicit money, but
then release them in hopes of stopping them for the same conduct in the future
to acquire more forfeited proceeds (Stillman, 2013). Perhaps the old saying
rings true here, “don’t bite the hand that feeds you.”
In short, opponents of civil forfeiture generally contend that its use has led
to widespread and systematic abuse, and that any benefits derived from it are
outweighed by its severe defects.

5

Experimental Design and Procedures

Given the debate about the merits and pitfalls of civil forfeiture, we designed
a laboratory experiment to test some of the competing justifications and
14 See also Blumenson and Nilsen (1998): “By more meaningful measures, however, the
Drug War has been an extraordinary failure. Drugs are more available—at higher purity
and lower prices—than they were at the start of the decade.”
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criticisms. But (of course) it would be impossible to test all competing justifications and criticism at once. So instead, we focused on the most contentious
component of civil asset forfeiture: statutes that allow law enforcement to keep
100% of forfeiture proceeds (or some variation thereof). Again, proponents
contend that these laws incentivize law enforcement to focus their attention on
crime with the largest societal impact, while at the same time alleging it allows
law enforcement to use forfeiture proceeds to continually reinvest back into
their crime fighting abilities. And again, opponents contend that these laws
distort legitimate law enforcement objectives where law enforcement instead
focuses on crimes with the highest forfeiture revenue rather than reducing
crime with the largest public benefit. To date, it is an open question whether
and under what conditions civil forfeiture increases or decreases welfare. We
set out to test these competing claims.
Each observation of our virtual world consists of four people who control
one of two types of avatars: red and blue. A single red avatar represents a
law enforcement officer and the three blue avatars represent the citizens at
large. The instructions for the red avatar are purposely succinct to leave the
discovery and interpretation of the environment up to the participant:
<page 1>
Welcome
This is an experiment in decision making. The instructions are
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions
you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid
to you in CASH at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment, you will be represented by the Red avatar you
see in the middle of the screen. You and the other people in the
experiment can move around the environment by left clicking on
the spot you wish to move to. Do this now. Notice that a red
circle marks the spot your avatar is moving towards.
<page 2>
Hammers and Walls
You can earn money two ways. The first is by knocking down
walls with a hammer. Each wall that you knock down generates 15
cents in earnings. Each period you are endowed with 2 hammers.
To knock down a wall, right click on the wall. Do this now. Notice
how your earnings in the bottom right of the screen have increased.
Only you have the ability to knock down walls.
You will not be able to knock down walls for the first 15 seconds
of a period.
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<page 3>
Tokens
Sometimes you may be able to collect tokens. Tokens may be used
to produce more hammers or to generate earnings.
You can only collect tokens of certain colors. Blue avatars can also
collect tokens. The colors that you and others can collect are listed
above the avatar. Knock down the wall around the red tokens and
pick up all of the tokens now by walking over the top of them.
To convert 7 tokens into a hammer, click on
this now.

the button. Do

To convert the remaining tokens into earnings, click on
button. Do this now. Each token you convert generates 3 cents.
Unconverted tokens are wasted at the end of a period.
<page 4>
Conclusion
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer them. If
you are finished with the instructions, please click the Start button.
The instructions will remain on your screen until the experiment
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begins. We need everyone to click the Start button before we can
begin the experiment.
Each period lasts for 60 seconds. In every period a dividing wall separates
the red avatar in the West from blue avatars in the East (see Figure 1). To
give the red avatar time to explore what walls are available to knock down
and the contents therein, the red avatar must wait 15 seconds before taking
any action.

Figure 1: Bird’s Eye View of World.

In this experiment, knocking down walls is analogous to fighting crimes.15
The red avatars are paid a 30¢ per period to knock down two walls, but only if
they knock down both walls. Inside rectangular walls are three types of colored
tokens: reds, pastels, and brights. Only red avatars can collect red tokens and
only blue avatars can pick up pastels. Red tokens represent the proceeds of
crimes that only law enforcement can claim with civil forfeiture—like cash.
Pastel tokens represent the benefits to the public of fighting crime, like safer
neighborhoods in which to be a shopkeeper. Each blue avatar is assigned one
pastel color that only he or she can collect. Red avatars can sometimes collect
any of three different bright-colored tokens and each blue avatar can pick up a
unique bright-colored token. Bright tokens represent tangible property that
the citizens can use, such as a car or house, but which law enforcement could
also use or sell for cash. In other words, reds and pastels are non-rivalrous but
brights with civil forfeiture are rivalrous.
During the first 40 seconds of every period, five tokens of each pastel color
randomly appear in the East. These non-rivalous tokens guarantee minimum
earnings of 15¢ per period and collecting them gives the citizens something
to do early in a period. Their second page of instructions explains how to
pick up tokens by walking over the top of them and that “a red avatar has the
ability to knock down the walls.” Their third page of instructions explains
how they can chat with each other but that “the red avatar cannot chat nor
15 By knocking down walls (eliminating crime), the red avatar (law enforcement) provides
a social benefit to the blue avatars (the public), represented by the tokens blue avatars can
collect inside the rectangular “crime wall.”
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Figure 2: The Four Baseline Sets of Tokens Behind Two Walls.

see chat.” These unguarded conversations are windows into how the blue
avatars think about the world and what they think of the red avatar. (Their
first and fourth pages of instructions convey the same information as reported
above.) A 4-min video demonstration of the software is available for viewing
at http://youtu.be/xuFiC327C1c.
Each replication of the world lasts for 35 periods. The first eight periods
are intended to give the participants experience with collecting tokens under
two different conditions, four periods when civil forfeiture is possible (Y ) and
four periods when it is not (N ). We say that civil forfeiture is possible when
red avatars can collect red and bright tokens and that civil forfeiture is not
possible when red avatars cannot collect any tokens. Over these first eight
periods we present four different sets of tokens, all behind a total of two walls.
Figure 2 displays these baseline sets which were each presented once with and
once without civil forfeiture, in random order without replacement. We used
the same ordering in all replications.
The first baseline scenario in Figure 2 displays 6 bright green, 6 bright
purple, and 6 bright brown tokens. Under the N condition only the citizens
can pick up these tokens, but for the law enforcement to earn 30¢, he or she
must break down the dividing wall and the wall surrounding the tokens. Under
the Y condition either the citizens or the law enforcement can collect the bright
tokens (6 green, 6 purple, and 6 brown). If law enforcement first breaks down
the rectangle wall, then he or she can pick up all 18 tokens before the citizens
can get to them, or leave some or all of them for the citizens to collect. In the
second baseline condition the tokens are non-rivalous pastels, one color per
citizen (6 pink, 6 gray, and 6 yellow). In both the Y and N conditions, only
the citizens can collect the pastel tokens. Since law enforcement only earns
30¢ by breaking down both walls, law enforcement generates 18¢ of benefits
for each citizen. The third and fourth baseline scenarios replicate the first
two with an additional 3 red tokens. Only under the Y condition can law
enforcement collect these 3 red tokens.
These baseline scenarios create the common experience that under the
Y condition, law enforcement is collecting money from real human beings
(as opposed to hypothetical people or inhuman robots).16 It also creates the
16 As McCabe et al. (2001) show, it matters whether people are interacting with humans
or robots. Our avatars fall somewhere in between, but they don’t act like robots. Because
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common experience that only law enforcement can break down walls to supply
citizens with additional benefits. Or not.
The next 27 periods present four different scenarios designed to explore
the implications of Y and N . These 27 periods are broken down into three
regimes of 9 periods. In half of the replications, denoted as YNY, participants
experience 9 periods of Y , followed by 9 periods of N and conclude with 9 more
periods of Y . The other half, denoted as NYN, face 9 periods of N , followed
by 9 periods of Y and conclude with 9 more periods of N . A switchover design
reduces the error attributable to differences in particular groups and paired
comparisons increase the power of the test.
Within each regime of 9 periods we present four different scenarios. We
initially randomized order of the scenarios without replacement in each regime
and then used the same order of scenarois for all replications in both the NYN
and YNY sequences.
The first scenario, which we call the Critic’s Supposition, is presented in
Figure 3. When faced with the choice of acquiring that which the public can
use privately or not doing so, law enforcement will acquire it. Notice that
there are three tokens for each person in the virtual world, 9¢ for everyone
under the Y condition. Critics of civil forfeiture suppose that the public would
be benefit under the N condition because enforcement will take the bright
green, purple and brown tokens under the Y condition. Each regime contains
three trials of the Critic’s Supposition.
As the name suggests, the Competing Suppositions scenario, displayed in
Figure 4, has a different prediction depending upon whether one is a proponent
or critic of civil forfeiture. Critics claim that when faced with a choice of
which crime to pursue, one that involves the cash proceeds of a crime and one
that does not, law enforcement will choose the former. In Figure 4, this is
the rectangular wall containing 10 red tokens and not the wall containing 30
pastel tokens for the public. Since earning 30¢ per period entails breaking
down two walls, critics suppose that law enforcement under the Y condition
will choose the wall with red tokens and one other wall, neither of which will
benefit the public.
Proponents of civil forfeiture, however, argue that taking the proceeds of
the crime allows law enforcement to fight more crime. This is possible if law
enforcement in this scenario foregoes 6¢ to provide benefits to the public (by
purchasing a third hammer for 7 tokens or 21¢ and breaking down a third wall
to receive only 15¢). That is, proponents argue that the public is no worse
off with civil forfeiture than without. Notice that if critics argue that law
enforcement will not “do the right thing” with civil forfeiture, there is no reason
to believe in this scenario that they will “do the right thing” either under the N
humans are controlling them and they know that other people are controlling them, the
avatars appear to act with purpose.
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Figure 3: The Critic’s Supposition Scenario.

condition, for with only two hammers a red avatar could break two rectangular
walls that would do nothing to benefit the public. In other words, we cannot
assume that without civil forfeiture that law enforcement would fight crimes
that benefit the public, i.e., break down the dividing wall and the walled-in
pastel tokens. It is thus an empirical question whether the public is better off
with or without civil forfeiture in the Competing Suppositions scenario. Each
regime of 9 periods contains two trials of the Competing Suppositions scenario.
To vary the cost of fighting more crime with the proceeds of civil forfeiture,
each regime contains one trial called the Competing Suppositions 2 scenario,
which is displayed in Figure 5. In this scenario if law enforcement breaks down
both rectangular walls with the red tokens, the net cost to the red avatar of
opening up pastel tokens to the public is 12¢ instead of the 6¢ in the Competing
Suppositions scenario (there are instead two additional walls to break down to
allow the citizens to collect pastel tokens).
In the Competing Suppositions scenario, the public cannot be made better
off with civil forfeiture; the public can only be made worse off with civil forfeiture. Our final scenario is an environment in which civil forfeiture could make
the public better off against the alternative of being not any worse off without it.
Figure 6 displays what we call the Proponent’s Supposition scenario. The best
case for the public in the N condition is that law enforcement breaks down the
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Figure 4: The Competing Suppositions Scenario.

Figure 5: The Competing Suppositions 2 Scenario.

dividing wall and one of the two walls. Inside both rectangular walls are 10 tokens per citizen. The top wall contains brights and the bottom reds and pastels.
Since red tokens are not collectable by law enforcement in the N condition,
the public is equally well off if either rectangular wall is broken down, provided,
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Figure 6: The Proponent’s Supposition Scenario.

of course, that the dividing is knocked down. But under the Y condition
civil forfeiture can make the public better off. By breaking down the bottom
rectangular wall and collecting the red tokens, law enforcement can buy a third
hammer to break down the top rectangular wall and open 10 bright tokens
per citizen, thereby making the public better off vis-à-vis the N condition. Or
law enforcement can seize the bright tokens. Or law enforcement can only
break down the two rectangular walls and collect all the reds and brights.
Relative to the previous scenarios, though, civil forfeiture has the potential in
the Proponent’s Supposition scenario to make the public better off by fighting
an additional crime thereby providing additional benefits for the public. Each
regime of 9 periods contains three trials of the Proponent’s Supposition scenario.
Over the course of three consecutive days in February, 2014, we conducted 10
one-hour sessions of 24 undergraduate participants (60.8% women, 39.2% men)
at Chapman University. Each volunteer only participated in one session. We
blocked the switchover designs within each session, i.e., half of the participants
were in the NYN and the other half in YNY. Thus, we have a total of 30
independent observations of red avatars in both the NYN and YNY sequences.
At the beginning of a session the experiment monitor seated the participants
in visually-isolated carrels containing a computer terminal. The participants
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then read the instructions at their own pace and were free to ask questions at
any time. Once everyone completed the instructions, the experiment began at
the same time for everyone in the room. A participant received $7 for showing
up on time plus what he or she earned in the experiment. Excluding the
show-up payment, mean earnings for red avatars was $19.09 (σ = $3.10) and
for blue avatars $9.52 (σ = $1.91).
Before we present our results, we anticipate a couple questions critical of our
project. First, are we simply learning something specific to this experimental
exercise? Yes, as does every other empirical study on any topic. That is
the nature of empirical inquiry. It is specified, peculiar, and particular–But
are we merely learning something about how undergraduates behave in a
crude video game? How can we compare an undergraduate’s actions as a
red avatar in the laboratory with that of a law enforcement officer in the
naturally occurring world?–If by “compare” you mean compare the knowledge,
experience, and professional training of a 45-year old sheriff with that of a
19-year old sophomore who paints his chest for the big conference football game,
then, yes, obviously these stereotypes are not comparable on these dimensions.
The inputs and outputs of a sheriff’s decision making process clearly differ
from those of our typical undergraduate participant in this virtual world, but
how they both go about making their decisions involves analogous trade-offs.
The policy question that is debated and that our experiment addresses is
whether or not civil forfeiture benefits the public. Both the sheriff and our
undergraduate participant weigh the private benefits of using acquired assets
for one’s own interest against the alternative of further benefiting the public.
The social calculus is the same. In this respect, our results cannot be casually
dismissed.

6

Results

We present the results of our experiment as a series of four findings. Each
unit of observation is one replication of the virtual world with four people.
Specifically, for citizen data we sum the tokens collected for all three individuals
and within a regime of 9 periods we also sum the tokens over all n trials for
a scenario, i.e., our results are conservatively presented. Each figure then
presents as a bar the average of those sums across each independent observation,
including the 95% confidence interval about that mean.
We begin by assessing the Critic’s Supposition with the average number of
bright tokens collected by citizens. The maximum number of bright tokens
that the citizens in total can collect in three trials is 27. As Figure 7 reports,
the data strongly support the supposition of the critics. Under civil forfeiture,
the citizens only collect on average, from left to right, 0.8, 3.5, and 1.3 of the
27 rivalrous bright tokens. In stark contrast the citizens collect 22.8, 23.4,

172

Michael Preciado and Bart J. Wilson

Bright Tokens

27

18
24.1

23.4

22.8

9
1.3

0.8
3.5

0
Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Figure 7: Average Number of Bright Tokens Collected by Citizens in Critic’s Supposition
Trials.

and 24.1 bright tokens in the N conditions. The treatment effects are clearly
robust to the ordering of the conditions, which is our first finding:
Finding 1. With the simple decision of seizing or not seizing rivalrous assets
in Critic’s Supposition, law enforcement overwhelmingly chooses to seize the
assets.
Law enforcement may seize rivalrous assets for themselves, but if given the
opportunity will they use the proceeds to the benefit of the public? Or will
law enforcement, when faced with the decision of helping the public or seizing
assets for their own use, simply seize the assets? Figure 8 reports the results
for the Competing Suppositions scenario. The answer is some of both, but in
the final analysis:
Finding 2. The public is better off without asset forfeiture in the Competing
Suppositions scenario.
To take advantage of the paired comparisons, the same red avatar with and
without civil forfeiture, let the subscript i = {1, 2, 3} denote the position of
treatment condition, Y or N , within a switchover design. For example, N2 is
the N regime in the YNY switchover. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we
reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the treatment conditions, Y1 vs.
N2 (W = −88, z = −2.26, p-value = 0.0238, two-tailed test) and N2 vs. Y3
(W = 84, z = 2.37, p-value = 0.0178, two-tailed test).17 Between switchover
designs, the difference between Y1 vs. N1 is also statistically different using
a Mann-Whitney test (U30,30 = 583, p-value = 0.0502, two-tailed test). The
return to baseline in both sequences also indicates that there are no hysteresis
effects of the order in presenting the treatment conditions to the participants.
17 The difference in treatment conditions is not as statistically robust in the NYN
switchover design: N1 vs. Y2 (W = 55, z = 1.71, p-value = 0.0873, two-tailed test)
and Y2 vs. N3 (W = −64, z = −1.64, p-value = 0.1010, two-tailed test).
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Figure 8: Average Number of Pastel Tokens Collected by Citizens in Competing Suppositions
Trials.

How do the red avatars make out in this scenario? There are a total of 1,200
red tokens in Y1 and Y3 and 600 in Y2 . Respectively, law enforcement collects
1,190 (99.2%) and 560 (93.3%) of them.
Recall the design in Figure 4 and decision facing the red avatars in N . To
earn 30¢ they must knock down two walls. But which two walls? We find
that the red avatars in N are inclined to help the blue avatars when there is
nothing to gain for themselves, but put that impulse into conflict with their
own gain in Y and those same red avatars think of themselves first and aid
the blue avatars much less.
The difference in the treatment conditions appears to further separate
in the Competing Suppositions 2 trial (see Figure 9).18 As collected by the
public, the mean number of pastel tokens as a percentage of the total available
drops from 42% (25.2 of 60 in Y1 ) in the Competing Suppositions scenario to
29.3% (8.8 of 30 in Y1 ) in Competing Suppositions 2 , but we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of no difference in the number of pastel tokens collected as a
percentage of the total available (U30,30 = 533, p-value = 0.2247, two-tailed
test). As before, law enforcement does not forego the opportunity to collect
the twice as many red tokens that are available in a period. They collect 96.7%
of the total 1,800 available in Y1 , Y2 , and Y3 . This small sensitivity test (it
costs 12¢ instead of 6¢ to help the public in Competing Suppositions 2 ) appears
not to matter. In sum:
Finding 3. Even though the cost of helping the public increases in Competing
Suppositions2 vis-à-vis Competing Suppositions, law enforcement does not
help the public less.
The scenarios for Critic’s and Competing Suppositions do not provide an
opportunity for law enforcement to fight another crime that benefits the public.
18 Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we also reject the null hypothesis of no difference in
the treatment conditions, Y1 vs. N2 (W = −89, z = −3.09, p-value = 0.0020, two-tailed
test) and N2 vs. Y3 (W = 65, z = 2.53, p-value = 0.0114, two-tailed test).
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Figure 9: Average Number of Pastel Tokens Collected by Citizens in Competing Suppositions 2
Trial.
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Figure 10: Average Number of Total Tokens Collected by Citizens in Proponent’s Supposition
Trials.

The scenario for Proponent’s Supposition does. Figure 10 reports the total
number of pastel and bright tokens that the public collects in the Proponent’s
Supposition scenario.
At best, the public is sometimes not worse off under Y and sometimes
the public is worse off. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no difference in Y1 vs. N2 (W = −58, z = −1.00,
p-value = 0.3173, two-tailed test) but we can reject the null hypothesis for N2
vs. Y3 (W = 116, z = 2.16, p-value = 0.0308, two-tailed test). For the other
switchover design, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in N1
vs. Y2 (W = 73, z = 1.35, p-value = 0.1770, two-tailed test), but we can reject
the null hypothesis for Y2 vs. N3 (W = −80, z = −2.26, p-value = 0.0238,
two-tailed test). Using a Mann-Whitney test, there is no difference between
Y1 and N1 (U30,30 = 534, p-value = 0.2193, two-tailed test) or N2 and Y2
(U30,30 = 458, p-value = 0.9115, two-tailed test), but we can reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between Y3 and N3 (U30,30 = 640, p-value = 0.0045,
two-tailed test).
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What is quite clear in this scenario is that law enforcement consistently
collects the bright tokens in Y . Of the 5,400 bright tokens in YNY, red avatars
sweep up 5,365 (99.4%) of them and in NYN they collect 100% of them. Law
enforcement also collects 97.4% of the red tokens in all three Y regimes.
Finding 4. When an additional crime involves rivalrous assets, law enforcement claims them, and so at best the public does not benefit from civil forfeiture
in Proponent’s Supposition and at worst the public is worse off with civil forfeiture.

7

Discussion and Conclusion

What has our experiment added to what we know about civil forfeiture? In the
zero sum world of civil forfeiture, the temptation for law enforcement personnel
to benefit themselves at the expense of the public is indeed strong and clearly
evident in our data. Seizing rivalrous assets is not a rare occurrence. It is
overwhelmingly what people do.19 And this does not go unnoticed. Indeed,
the red avatar’s use of civil forfeiture provokes tremendous resentment in the
blue avatars. What do the blue avatars think of the conduct of the red avatars?
Here is a sample of the comments to each other in the heat of the moment:
• omg hes stealing them all
• he has too much power
• red has no incentive to help us
• were his peasents
• If they’re doing this just to be greedy; that’s messed up...
• trying to determine just how misanthropic the red guy can be
• the red is really heartless
• i feel so powerless!
• some reds just wanna see the world burn
• im personally offended
19 To date, participants in stylized dictator games have only overwhelmingly taken all the
money from another participant if the experiment was conducted with double anonymity
and/or they have earned the stakes. See, e.g., Hoffman et al. (1996) and Cherry et al. (2002).
It would seem that process matters. Our red avatars took the money with single anonymity
protocols when the decision is embedded in a task of knocking down walls and picking up
tokens. Perhaps they felt they earned it through work.
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• he knows exactly what he’s doing
• not cool red
• we are a metaphor for the 3 little pigs/and he is the big bad wolf
• k thanks for eating our coins red
• red will steal them from you
• red can take all of our colors
• this is one of those examples where greed isnt good
• why be so mean?
• totally not cool
• there is no incentive for him to help us, it is all whether or not he wants
to be nice
• antisocial red
• red person is the worst
• this fool sucks
• he just ate all our things
• thief!
• I hate red.
• dick move
• SO NOT COOL AT ALL
• not a homie
• die avatar
The key to understanding the conduct of the red avatars is that this is a zero
sum and not a positive sum environment. Participants from the same subject
pool regularly exhibit high levels of trust, trustworthiness, and intertemporal
reciprocity in other economic experiments.20 If it is you or me who is going
to profit in the experiment, as it is in this experiment, then people choose
“me.” 21 But if it is you and me, a “we” who can profit, then people find a way
20 See,

e.g., Smith and Wilson (2017), Osborn et al. (2015), and Kaplan et al. (2012).
Pecorino and Van Boening (2010) for another experiment on litigation disputes in
which participants consistently choose “me.”
21 See
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to make each other better off with personal social exchange. Mutual benefits
from acting jointly serve as an external incentive to do the right thing, to do
right by each other. In both the naturally occurring world and in our virtual
world, civil forfeiture creates a zero sum problem. As a blue avatar above
recognizes, “there is no incentive for him to help us, it is all whether or not he
wants to be nice.” Both law enforcement and our red avatars are removed from
the positive sum world of sociality; neither can create mutual benefits with
the public.22 With a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, law enforcement
personnel operate above the plane of ordinary human intercourse and the rules
that govern it, which is why civil forfeiture invites zero sum thinking and zero
sum conduct.
At the beginning of this article we presented an open question: does civil
forfeiture allow law enforcement to bolster its fight against crime or does
it incentivize law enforcement to maximize forfeiture revenue rather than
reducing crime with the largest public benefit? We find that the public is
better off in our virtual world without civil forfeiture.23 Given the choice of
using civil forfeiture to benefit the public at large or to maximize forfeiture
revenue for themselves, people choose themselves. Civil forfeiture is not a
problem of “bad apples,” but of bad laws that encourage bad conduct.
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